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I.

INTRODUCTION

The State does not object to a reasonably expedited schedule that
allows sufficient time to gather, process, and present to the Court the
information and argument necessary for it to issue a fair and considered
order. However, the briefing schedule proposed by the Plaintiffs is not
calculated to bring the best information and briefing before the Court.
Preparing a full and complete report and briefing that provide real data,
explanation, and assistance to the Court is not possible under the truncated
deadlines they propose. Their proposed schedule is a recipe for providing
the Court with insufficient information and argument for its decisionmaking. The State provides an alternative schedule herein that allows time
to accomplish the task, while still expediting review.
The Court should decline the Plaintiffs’ request that it identify and
threaten sanctions now, before the 2016 Legislature has even convened.
Doing so likely would delay progress toward constitutional compliance
rather than encourage it. Moreover, the sanctions advocated by the
Plaintiffs are unworkable and constitutionally unsound. The proper time to
determine whether further sanctions are needed is at the conclusion of the
2016 legislative session.
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II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Neither the Court Nor the Legislature Would Be Well Served
by Truncating the Briefing Schedule
1.

Plaintiffs’ arguments for a truncated briefing schedule
rest on a series of unfounded premises

First, the Plaintiffs argue that the 2016 legislative session is the
final opportunity for the State to achieve constitutional compliance by
2018. In fact, two more legislative sessions will occur before the
beginning of the 2017-18 school year. And by constitutional design, the
2017 session will be a long, biennial budget-writing session.
Second, the Plaintiffs assume the 2016 Legislature will accomplish
nothing. But the outcome of the legislative session cannot be assumed.
The only certainty is that there is a constitutionally mandated process by
which the Legislature enacts policy and budget legislation. The House and
Senate are constitutionally established as deliberative bodies who can take
action only by achieving a sufficient number of votes, with each vote
independently cast by independently elected representatives of the people.
Members are as diverse as the populace they represent and they must be
responsive to all state obligations of all levels of importance. That
constitutional process cannot be short-circuited or bypassed.
Moreover, there are many measures of progress toward ultimate
constitutional compliance. The $4.8 billion dollars of new biennial
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spending committed to basic education compared with 2012 is but one
measure of progress. The issues to be addressed between now and 2018
are complicated, requiring difficult decisions about revenue and spending
that affect all of the State’s obligations—not just basic education. Even as
to the funding of basic education, challenging problems remain to be
resolved—such as how to accommodate local discretion in implementing
the state’s program and deploying state funding allocations while still
ensuring accountability among the State’s 295 school districts. The steps
taken toward resolving these kinds of issues also represent progress.
Third, the Plaintiffs erroneously posit that haste is more important
than providing the Court with a fair and accurate presentation of the facts
and issues. Like the Court, the Legislature has schedules and deadlines it
follows. Important legislation—including any adjustments to a $38 billion
biennial operating budget—typically is not finalized until the closing days
and hours of the legislative session, and it does not take effect without
being presented to the Governor. Wash. Const. art. III, § 12. Consistent
with the Court’s July 2012 Order,1 the Legislature communicates with the
Court through its Article IX Committee. At the conclusion of the session,
that Committee must meet, reach consensus, and direct staff in preparing
the report to the Court. Typically, the Committee has scheduled one or
1

Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (July 12, 2012).
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more public meetings as part of its process. It is not reasonable to expect
the Article IX Committee, legislative staff, and the State’s attorneys to
meet, discuss, gather information, write, format, and file an accurate,
useful, and complete report and briefing mere hours after the session
finishes.
The Plaintiffs do not explain how denying reasonable time to
accomplish these tasks will make a positive difference in the Court’s
ability to evaluate the State’s progress. Their sole conclusory rationale is
that everyone will know what has been enacted the minute the session
adjourns and therefore the State needs no time to prepare a report and
brief. Pltf ’s Mot. at 8-9. By their logic, since legislating is a public
process, the Plaintiffs will also know what has been done and therefore
they need no time to prepare their critique of the State’s progress. Under
that logic, the Court also will know what has been enacted and therefore
could skip the briefing altogether and simply issue an order the day after
adjournment.
Of course, this is all absurd. The stakes are too high. For the Court
to issue a well-considered order, it needs a full and complete report and
briefing that addresses the actual circumstances, issues, and actions taken.
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2.

The Court should establish a 2016 briefing schedule
that provides both parties sufficient time to prepare
submissions that thoughtfully and adequately address
the current circumstances

Plaintiffs give no weight to the gravity of the orders they seek from
the Court. In issuing orders that are directed at compelling legislative
action—a power reserved by the Constitution to the legislative branch—
the Court is operating at the margin of its constitutional power, and there
is no other avenue of appeal should the Court misstep. The constitutional
stakes are too high—for the State, the Court, the Legislature, and the
people we all serve—to rush to determine the appropriate next step. That
determination should not be made until the circumstances and facts are
established and the options fully briefed.
In 2012, the Court established a briefing schedule to govern
reporting while the Court retained jurisdiction. It provides that the State’s
submissions are due at the conclusion of each legislative session from
2013 through 2018 inclusive, within 60 days after the final biennial or
supplemental operating budget is signed by the Governor, and at such
other times as the Court may order. The Plaintiffs seek to reduce that
60-day period to a matter of hours. Although the Plaintiffs’ proposed
schedule is unsupportable, the State is amenable to reasonably
abbreviating the default schedule established in the Court’s July 2012
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Order. The State therefore can agree to shorten the default schedule by
half and offers the following alternative schedule for the Legislature’s
report and the parties’ briefing addressing that report:


The Legislature’s Report and State’s Brief to be filed 30 days
after the Governor signs the supplemental budget.



Plaintiffs’ Response to be filed 20 days after State’s Brief.



State’s Reply to be filed 10 days after Response.

The Court then may schedule oral argument as it deems appropriate.
There is no good reason to require both a “post-adjournment
filing” and a “post budget filing.” Legislation does not become law until
the Governor signs it, subject to any vetoes, or the constitutionallyspecified time passes without the Governor’s signature (five days during
session, 20 days after adjournment). Wash. Const. art. III, § 12. Action by
the Governor provides certainty as to the outcome of the session, and it
necessarily must occur shortly after adjournment. Reporting and briefing
to the Court therefore can be accomplished in one filing.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Sanctions Disregard Constitutional and
Institutional Limits on the Court’s Remedial Powers and
Would Be Counterproductive and Harmful
The Plaintiffs ask the Court to decide now on the sanction it will

impose for the 2016 Legislature’s failure to produce a plan—before the
Legislature has even convened and before the Court is informed as to the
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facts and circumstances attending the Legislature’s actions. The Court
should not do so, for at least five reasons.
1.

Plaintiffs disregard the basis for the Court’s contempt
finding

The Plaintiffs continue to treat the failure to produce a plan as if it
is a constitutional failure. It is not. With regard to contempt sanctions, the
issue is not whether the Legislature has failed to meet its constitutional
duty under article IX, section 1—the Court already has decided that issue.
The issue is not whether the State has achieved compliance by 2018—that
deadline has not yet passed. The immediate issue, and the only basis for
having found the State in contempt, is the failure to submit a “complete
plan.” The 2016 Legislature can remove that basis for contempt.
2.

Plaintiffs disregard constitutional limits on the Court’s
contempt powers

In their attempt to expand contempt sanctions beyond their factual
predicate—the failure to produce a plan—the Plaintiffs disregard
constitutional limits on the Court’s powers. There is no precedent in this
state that authorizes the Court to expand its contempt power beyond the
constitutional limits on judicial authority. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs
continue to ask the Court to use its contempt power to compel specific
legislative actions that are constitutionally delegated to the Legislature.
See Brown v. Owens, 165 Wn.2d 706, 718-19, 206 P.3d 310 (2009) (the
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doctrine of separation of powers stands as a constitutional bar against one
branch of government invading or undermining powers that are
constitutionally delegated to another branch).
The Plaintiffs’ second proposed sanction (suspending all “tax
exemption statutes” (Pltf ’s Mot. at 13)) is especially problematic in this
regard. In briefing filed in July 2014, the State explained the potential
separation of powers problems with several sanctions suggested by
Plaintiffs, including the ad hoc invalidation of taxing statutes that have not
been challenged. Reaching that far afield to determine the taxing policies
of Washington unquestionably invades the Legislature’s constitutionally
designated function.
Article VII, section 5 of the Washington Constitution vests the
State’s authority to impose taxes solely in the Legislature. See Larson v.
Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wn.2d 752, 770, 131 P.3d 892
(2006) (“It is elementary that the power of taxation, subject to
constitutional limitations, rests solely in the legislature.”) (quoting State ex
rel. Tacoma Sch. Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 690, 30 P.2d 638 (1934));
Ban-Mac, Inc. v. King County, 69 Wn.2d 49, 51, 416 P.2d 694 (1966)
(“[Article VII] places revenue and taxation matters under legislative
control. We may construe but not legislate in tax matters.”); Gruen v. State
Tax Comm’n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 64, 211 P.2d 651 (1949) (“[T]he state’s fiscal
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policy has been by the constitution delegated to the legislature and not to
this court.”), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Wash. State
Finance Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). If the
Legislature falters, the constitutional remedy is to invalidate the effort and
direct the Legislature to try again; it is not for the Court to step into the
Legislature’s shoes.
3.

Plaintiffs’ proposed sanction would harm schoolchildren

The other sanction the Plaintiffs propose would effectively shut
down schools. In briefing filed in July 2014, the State explained how this
proposed sanction directly harms schoolchildren, especially those without
the economic means to obtain alternative educational opportunities. It is
based on the false premise that no education is preferable to the education
Washington students currently receive.
4.

Plaintiffs seek to invalidate statutes that are not
identified, briefed, or shown to be unconstitutional

The scope of the sanctions proposed by the Plaintiffs is undefined
and unknown. No one has identified to the Court which “tax exemption
statutes” (Pltf ’s Mot. at 13) the Plaintiffs would have suspended. And the
Plaintiffs do not identify which “K-12 school statutes” they believe “are
not amply funded” (Pltf ’s Mot. at 12)—would they have all 72 chapters of
Title 28A invalidated or just those they pick and choose?
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Even if the specific statutes the Plaintiffs would have suspended or
invalidated could be identified, they are not properly before the Court. The
State is not aware of any decision of this Court that suspended or
invalidated statutes that had not been specifically challenged and briefed
by the parties.
Nor is the State aware of any decision of this Court that suspended
or invalidated a statute for any reason other than its unconstitutionality—
indeed, unconstitutionality is the only basis for the Court to invalidate a
statute. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar.
Ass’n, 83 Wn.2d 523, 527–28, 520 P.2d 162 (1974) (a court has no
substantive power to review and nullify acts of the Legislature apart from
passing on their constitutionality).2 Since statutes are presumed to be
constitutional, the Plaintiffs bear the heavy burden of demonstrating their
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.3 School Dists.’ Alliance for

2

See also City of Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wn.2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 872 (1968):
Is it proper for the courts to try to compel the adoption of legislation
and the expenditure of public funds for the attainment of seemingly
desirable ends by refusing to uphold existing legislation? Is this a
legitimate use of the judicial power? We think not. . . . Obviously, the
courts ought not invalidate legislation simply in the hope of compelling
better legislation.
Id. at 800-01 (Hale, J., with two judges concurring and two concurring in result).
3
To be precise, the State has found no case in which the Court has “suspended”
a statute. Accordingly, it appears that the “suspension” the Plaintiffs seek is in reality a
kind of “temporary invalidation” which, if it exists as a permissible remedy, is subject to
the same constitutional presumptions and limitations as any other request to invalidate a
statute.

10

Adequate Funding of Spec. Educ. v. State, 170 Wn.2d 599, 605-06, 244
P.3d 1 (2010); Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 220, 5 P.3d 691
(2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920 (2001). That burden cannot be met
where specific statutes have not been identified or briefed.
5.

Plaintiffs’ proposed sanctions may not lead to more
rapid constitutional compliance

The Plaintiffs wrongly assume that identifying heightened
sanctions on the State now will lead to more rapid action by the
Legislature and more certain compliance with article IX, section 1. In fact,
the opposite may be true. Progress may slow because of legislative
resistance to Court orders that are perceived—rightly or wrongly—to have
invaded the Legislature’s constitutional sphere.
The Legislature is not just another litigant before the Court. It is a
co-equal branch of government with separate and specific constitutional
obligations that may lie beyond the judicial power to compel. Imposing
the proposed sanctions could have an unintended effect: shifting
legislative focus away from solving the problem and toward the Court’s
order.4
4

See, e.g., Some Lawmakers Challenge Court Over Mccleary Sanctions,
SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 22, 2015, 1:36 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/some-lawmakers-challenge-court-over-sanctions/; Mike Faulk, Local Senators Call
for Push Against Supreme Court Over Education Funding, YAKIMA HERALD (Aug. 21,
2015), http://www.yakimaherald.com/blogs/checks_and_balances/local-senators-call-forpush-against-supreme-court-over-education/article_89fdc46c-4827-11e5-8c70934e1f3094a0.html.
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Relatedly, the State believes the Court has misapprehended the
substantial progress the Legislature has made since 2012. Plaintiffs’
ongoing disdain for the progress made to date has only contributed to that
situation. The Legislature is on track to fully fund all the commitments it
made in SHB 2776 (Laws of 2010, ch. 236) by the deadlines it enacted in
2010. It is continuing to work to resolve the remaining issues necessary to
achieve constitutional compliance. Plaintiffs wrongly assume only
legislative inaction and failure. The Court should not do the same. The
Court needs to assess the situation at the end of the 2016 session and
determine at that time what action is appropriate going forward.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Court should adopt the reasonable schedule proposed by the
State for briefing following the 2016 legislative session:


The Legislature’s Report and State’s Brief to be filed 30 days
after the Governor signs the supplemental budget.



Plaintiffs’ Response to be filed 20 days after State’s Brief.



State’s Reply to be filed 10 days after Response.

The Court should not identify or threaten any sanction at this time.
It should wait until it is fully informed as to the facts and circumstances of
actions taken by the 2016 Legislature, and it can be fully informed only if
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it allows adequate time for preparation of the Legislature's Report and the
parties' briefs.
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